Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Theory of Mind: "Theory of Mind" (ToM), refers to the ability to be aware that other people or animals have their own thoughts, beliefs, intentions and emotions, which may differ from your own. It is about understanding that the mental states of others can influence their actions and decisions. The term comes from Daniel Dennett (Dennett, D. (1978). Beliefs about beliefs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 568-570). It has been further developed by many authors in psychology, including Premack, Woodruff, Perner and Baron-Cohen._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Josef Perner on Theory of Mind - Dictionary of Arguments
Slater I 156 Theory of Mind/ToM/Perner: VsPerner: The whole point of Wimmer and Perner’s (1983)(1) study was to design a task that could not be mastered by mere behavior reading: only by representing the character’s belief was it possible to adequately predict her behavior. VsPerner: Problem: the (…) premise, that it is not warranted to infer the ability to represent mental states from success at the false belief task, is (…) questionable. As a matter of fact, if a typically developing child passes the standard false-belief task, the immediate inference is that she has the underlying ability to represent mental states. Similarly, if a chimpanzee were ever to pass a task structurally similar to the standard FBT (false-belief task), the scientific community would take this as the first solid evidence of ToM (Theory of Mind) in non-human animals. The interpretation of FBT passes in ASD has been radically different in the mindblindness framework. >Autism/psychological theories, >False-Belief Task/psychological theories, >Theory of Mind/developmental psychology. It seems that when an individual with ASD passes a ToM test, they are never credited with a fully fledged representational ToM. (Rajendran and Mitchell 2007)(2). 1. Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition. 13, 103—128. 2. Rajendran, G., & Mitchell, P. (2007). Cognitive Theories of Autism. Developmental Review, 27, 224-260. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Perner, Josef Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
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